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Agency: The Internal Split of Structure
Yong Wang1

In this article I first examine the ways in which the dual terms of structure and agency are used

in sociological theories. Then, relying on Lacan s notions of split-subject, the formula of sexua
tion, and forms of discourses, and Laclaus theory of ideological hegemony, I argue that agency
in most current sociological formulations is but a posited other of the structure that dissolves if

examined closely; it is similar to the Lacanian fantasmic object. To resolve the fundamental
paradoxes in s truc ture-agency theories, I reformulate structures as paradoxical, incomplete, and
contingent symbolic formations that are always partial and unstable due to their inclusion and
exclusion operations. Consequently, social transformational agency consists in the structural
inconsistencies that open structural gaps available to social actors. As a result, agency can be
recognized in two moments conceived as two symbolic gestures. From this perspective, agency
as such is always a possibility qua potential and its efficacy is always retroactively recognized
actualized from within a new social structure or symbolic order.

KEY WORDS: actor; agency; structure; structure-agency theories.

INTRODUCTION
The abundant literature on structure-agency theories2 not only attests
to its indisputable influence but also bears witness to the rising discontents
about the existing formulation of the core concepts: structure and agency.

As Meyer and Jepperson indicate, "there is more abstract metatheory
about 'actors' and their 'agency' than substantive arguments about the
topic" (2000:101). Archer's discussion on the upward, downward, and cen
tral conflations may be the most systematic critique of the dominant theo
retical strategies with regard to structure and agency (Archer, 2000, 2003).

Worth quoting here are her comments on what she calls "amalgam
1 Department of Sociology, Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey 07043;
e-mail: wangy@mail.montclair.edu.

2 Here, I refer to structuration theory, theories of practice, and theories that employ the dual
concepts of structure and agency as their central conceptual tool in general.
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of practices," which, according to Archer, "oscillates wildly between
voluntarism and determinism, without being able to specify the conditions
under which agents have greater degrees of freedom or, conversely, work
under a considerable stringency of constraints" (Archer, 2000:6). Working
within the paradigm of systems theory and apparently having no intention
to salvage the concept of agency, Fuchs probably provides the strongest
critique of Archer's work. He argues that agency is "a residual, consisting

of that proportion of variance unaccounted for by social structure.

Agency is not the cause, but the effect, of failures at prediction" (Fuchs,
2001:34). Although I find Fuchs's above quoted argument very illuminat
ing and agree with him with little reservation,3 I nevertheless note that
failures at prediction or explanation ought not to be the reason to dismiss
the concept of agency. Therefore, in this article I examine the dual con
cepts of structure and agency following two intellectual traditions: Lacan's
formulation of the split-subject and Laclau's theory on ideological hege
mony, which, respectively, lend new conceptual tools to reformulate, on
one hand, the possibility of agency as residing outside formations of struc
ture; and on the other, structures as hegemonic constructions that always
contain its beyond or exclusion, which renders agency possible.
Before approaching the specifics of structure and agency, a big pic
ture is to be drawn: a picture that addresses the fundamental paradoxes of
structure and agency. One effective way to draw this picture is to engage

the limits of the conceptual and relational domains of structure and

agency, the points that serve as gestures of the exclusion of a "beyond."
Along this line, Pickering's (1993, 2000) conception of material agency,

for example, points to the beyond of a human-centered conception of
agency, one that is central to structuration theory and theories of social

practice.
Although Pickering's subjectivizing gesture in construing the unknown

material world as a form of "resistance" is itself problematic (see, e.g.,
Breslau, 2000; Jones, 1996), it nonetheless raises an important question: Do
we humans live in a world of our own will? If not, how do we account for
the material world that is always already part of our reality? What is
paradoxical in Pickering's strategy is that, in a purely symbolic (human)
gesture, he tries to erase the difference between human and nonhuman
agency. If Pickering's strategy is to directly attribute agency to the
(unknown) material world, Breslau (one of Pickering's strongest critics),
3 Having originated from two different intellectual traditions, Lacanian perspective and sys
tems theory established by Niklas Luhmann share some fundamental features, which can
not be addressed in this article. It suffices to say here that the shared features may very
well find their origin in their similar starting points: signifier as possibility of knowledge
and distinctions as observation.
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opts for structure qua actor-network to address the issue of nonhuman
agency. According to Breslau, not only the actor-network is "thoroughly

relational" (Breslau, 2000:300), the human and nonhuman agencies are
both relationally constituted as well. The price to be paid for a thoroughly
relational ontological status of the actor-network is the determination of
the network as such. What act, then, determines the actor-network as such,
namely, its symbolic (over)determination, its double? The formation of an
existing actor-network entails a determination of the network as a gesture
of exclusion through positing a beyond that is nonrelational. For instance,
a network of CEOs and high-level managers of large corporations would
only function if it excludes, for instance, low-level employees. Of course,
this is not to deny that inside the network agency/power is relationally
constituted. Hence, the paradox is that the determination of a relational
network is not relational.
On the side of structure, similar paradoxes are not far away. Take for
example the central thesis of structuration theory that structure both
enables and constrains (the actor in her action) (Emirbayer and Mische,

1998:1003; Giddens, 1984:169; Hays, 1994:61). Questions soon arise: How
did Nazi concentration camps enable the Jews, or the Soviet gulags enable
millions of dissidents and innocent citizens? It should be noted emphati

cally here that concentration camps and their variations are precisely
power structures that are devised to deprive human beings of their agency.

This seemingly extreme case points to a fundamental paradox in struc
ture-agency theories: when the only function of structure is to erase the

last trace of agency. Even if one resorts to "less extreme" cases, one

would find similar problems. Take another example: the racist segregation
ist system of the U.S. South. The segregation system never simply con

strained and enabled people; it enabled one group but constrained

another. Therefore, structure is not a neutral force that constrains and

enables an abstract actor or actors. The argument that structures con
strain and enable obfuscates the fundamental paradox in the relation
between structure and agency, the fundamental antagonism resulting from
structural formations conditioned by exclusion.

THE ENTANGLEMENT OF STRUCTURE AND AGENCY
In this section I try to untangle the intricate knots of structure and
agency with a focus on the presupposed constraints and enablements that
are considered the fundamental functions of structure. In recent literature
on theories of structure-agency, one can hardly find the postulate that
structure is merely a set of constraints or limits. In fact, as early as in
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1986, Swidler's (1986) metaphor of the cultural "toolkit" had already
unequivocally suggested the enabling capacity of culture qua structure. Of

course, the problem with this image is the presupposed actor who is
already able to select and apply cultural tools to varied situations. One
na?ve but nonetheless necessary question can be posed here: Is the ability
to use the tools innate to the actor? If not, one is compelled to ask: Are
such abilities already some structural effects?4
Unfortunately, ensuing efforts in theoretical and empirical works on
structure-agency have not departed from this posited capability qua agency
as a fundamental trait in the actor. For instance, despite his many trenchant
insights on structure-agency, Sewell surprisingly makes the point that "a
capacity for agency?for desiring, for forming intentions, and for acting
creatively?is inherent in all humans.... [T]hat humans are born with only a
highly generalized capacity for agency, analogous to their capacity to use
language.... But a capacity for agency is as much a given for humans as the
capacity for respiration" (Sewell, 1992:20) In light of Zizek's discussion on
the Hegelian moments of possibility and actuality, which states that actual
ity is the conjunction of possibility qua potentiality and some externally
(imposed) forces (Zizek, 1993:141-142), one can immediately recognize that
in Sewell's proposition half the set is missing. To further illustrate this
point, I would like to use Zizek's example on the correlation between prole

tariat revolution and the working class (Zizek, 1993:142) In a Marxist
framework, the working class is potentially capable of revolution. The only
problem is that revolution would not automatically happen when all the
conditions, such as extreme exploitation and stark poverty, are mature.
(There may be riots.) That is to say, the revolutionary potential of the pro
letariat cannot be actualized without an external act that recognizes this
potential and forces the proletariat to act as a revolutionary subject. One
necessary component imposed externally onto the working class qua revolu
tionary potential is the Party, which would transform the working class into

a revolutionary subject, from in-itself to for-itself. Along the same line of
argument, humans' capability of using language qua actuality is a two-sided
coin: on one side is some innate capacity for language use; and on the other
the externally imposed social cultural institutions that socialize humans qua
potentiality into actual language users. What is crucial with regard to this
argument is the asymmetry between potentiality and actuality: potentiality
can be recognized only in its actuality but not vice versa. We should even
push this argument one step further: the assertion that we all have capacity
for agency is nothing but a gesture to create an illusion of a primordially
4 A "yes" answer to the question registers nothing but the failure of explanation. In other
words, if the ability to employ the cultural toolkit were to be understood as a certain
innate capacity, what is effectively posited is an inaccessible and impenetrable Thing.
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leveled ground that never materializes in its actuality; what really exists,

namely, what is actualized, are our unequal capacities that result from
social structures of unequal social, economic, political, and cultural means.
Here, I would like to point out that Sewell's assertion for the existence of
such capacity has already departed from his arguably most important point
in the article discussed here, namely: "Agency is implied by the existence of
structure" (Sewell, 1992:20).
Another notable theorizing effort on structure-agency is Hays's four

ways of understanding the notion of agency. Rejecting the structural
deterministic thesis that agents are "carriers or instruments of social struc
tures" (Hays, 1994:62) and the voluntaristic conception of agency, Hays
offers two alternatives.
Second, one can say that people make structures at the same times as structures
make people: through everyday practices, the choices made by agents serve to cre

ate and recreate structures continuously. Third, one can argue that people are
agents insofar as they make choices that have significant transformational conse
quences in terms of the nature of social structure themselves. (Hays, 1994:62)

The first alternative, the second form of agency above, which Hays
calls structurally reproductive agency, creates more problems than solu

tions. First, if we accept Hays's explication that structures are repro

duced "only through the interactional activities of individuals"
(1994:62), can we also say that structures have always already taken
into account people's interactional activities as their very mechanism
for reproduction? The problem with this first alternative is its funda

mental ambiguity: either interactions imply certain agency on the inter
actants' side or interactions are always already structural processes and

effects. The question is: Where does one locate agency? If we opt for
the former, we claim an innate capacity in the interactant. If one
locates agency on structure's side, one already loses the human-centered

notion of agency. If the notion is to be of any explanatory power,
however, the one gesture to be absolutely avoided is precisely the
obfuscating argument that agency has to be situated in structural con
texts. Following Fuchs's argument that the possibility of observing
agency is often a matter of scale (Fuchs, 2001:25-26); namely, as one
examines actions or interactions at the (alleged) micro level, one is able

to attribute agency to the actor as a person with intentions, wants,
beliefs, and so forth. However, if we take Fuchs's observational strat
egy one step further to examine the forms of intention, wants, and
beliefs, one would find agency dissolving again into the social struc
tural: intentions, wants, beliefs, roles, and identities are already either

components or effects of the social symbolic order. It is in this sense
that socially reproductive agency always eludes our grasp: at the very

This content downloaded from
130.68.120.136 on Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:35:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Wang

486

moment we think we have a good hold of it we realize that what is in
our hands is nothing but some elements of social structures.
Second, Hays recognizes that with regard to this form of agency,
choices made by agents are ones "among an available set of structurally
provided alternatives" (1994:63). If this is true, does the empty gesture of
making a choice regulated by structures suggest any agency in the choice
maker? In a contemporary case, we have President Bush's offer of choice
regarding the War on Terror: you are either with us or against us. Either

way, one remains in a social reality precisely structured by the two
choices. Such "actions" of choosing are empty because the choices are

forced, given only to sustain the appearance of choice. Perhaps the case of
Willis's (1977) lads, as discussed by Hays (1994:163), is more illuminating
with regard to structurally reproductive agency, but in a much different
sense. Willis's lads are a group of working-class schoolboys who refuse to
conform to disciplinary rules and academic norms in school. Their defi
ance against the bourgeois ideology of achievement, not surprisingly,
lands them in the working class. Is this not a perfect example that struc
tures have already taken into account their own deviation, which is
already a structural choice? One is tempted to argue that the capitalist
class structure needs some people, to use Merton's (1957) words, who
reject cultural goals so that an under or working class is reproduced. The
defiant gestures of Willis's lads' to distance themselves from the ideology
of achievement sustain the very system they seemingly reject. To the extent
that Willis's lads are not aware of the fact that their defiance is the very

cause of their reproduction as members of the working class, this case
shows perfectly one form of ideology characterized by Zizek (1991)?
"They know not what they do." A more complex form of ideology that
functions to sustain social structure of post-totalitarian system, according

to Zizek, is "They know, but nevertheless...." (Zizek, 1991:241-245). An
exemplary case of the second form is Pavel's proverbial greengrocer in

pre-1989 Prague, who, though indifferent to the totalitarian system, com
plains in private about the corruption and inefficiency of the bureaucracy,
nonetheless faithfully performs his duty: hanging out signs saying "Long

Live Socialism" on state holidays (Zizek, 2001:90). How are we to address
the issue of agency in this form? The crucial point not to be missed here is
that the power structure already takes into account such complaints, the
cynical distance the subject carefully maintains to resist the overwhelming
sense of guilt. As long as the subject performs his or her duty, the system
has nothing to worry about.5 It is in this sense that I would argue that in
5 A perfect example is doubtlessly contemporary Chinese society where a totalitarian system
is sustained because everyone carefully calculates what one says in public while at the same
time tries to benefit from the many "choices" available in the economic domain.
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cases of Willis's lads and the "greengrocer" in post-totalitarian societies,

agency has to be (re)located in structure, not in the actor, because the
reproduction of structures effectively relies on the actor's illusion of
choices in forms of defiance and distancing.
Despite the above critique, one of Hays's important contributions to
structure-agency theory is her distinction between socially reproductive

and socially transformational agencies (Hays, 1994). Hays's second alter
native, namely, her third form of agency, or socially transformational
agency, captures the thrust of the notion of agency as something at least
not completely on the side of structure. That said, some crucial questions
remain unanswered. First, how is the significance of transformational con
sequences recognized? Second, correlative to the first question, how is the

"nature of social structures themselves" (Hays, 1994:62) determined?

What I try to suggest here is that measuring the significance of transfor
mational consequences always entails a social symbolic order within which
the natures of the social structure to be transformed and the new social
structure are defined. Furthermore, what about failed endeavors to change
certain social order? Do those actors who participate in failed attempts
have agency? I will return to these questions in a later section. It suffices
to say here that to answer these questions, the notion of structure itself
needs to be reformulated. One of the socially transformational agent's
main tasks is to (re)define or (re)frame the existing social structure and
the new social structure the agent strives for. The theorist, as a second
order observer, to borrow a term from the systems theorist, has to exam
ine the social symbolic order within which the subject of transformation is
actualized and agency is recognized.

AGENCY: THE INTERNAL SPLIT OF STRUCTURE
If structural constraints and enablements inevitably point to the effi
cacy of structure at least in the case of socially reproductive agency, one is
tempted to perform a pseudo-mathematical operation: subtraction. The
question then is: When one takes away structural constraints and enable
ments, what is left of the actor or agent? The answer is not as obvious as
it might appear. In fact, one can reasonably argue that this is the very
moment from which social theorists move apart from one another. For
instance, Giddens has to assert the duality of structure and to subsume
both structure and agency under the notion of structuration to heal the

cut that creates the dual terms. Archer, who obviously is against such
"central conflation," nonetheless constructs a narrative trying to unify
structure and agency in temporality, which would allow what she calls
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analytical dualism. In Archer's scheme, agency only returns as the present

"I" "as a source of creativity and innovation" (Archer, 2003:73). Emirba
yer and Mische's direct treatment of "What is agency?" is in a sense not
fundamentally different from Archer's.6 The real problem is not that after
taking away structural constraints and enablements, nothing is left. There
is indeed something left: the leftover. The real task is how to formulate
this leftover. From the Lacanian perspective, this leftover is both an effect
produced by the very notion of structure and the limits that formations of
structures stumble upon and fail. In the Lacanian framework, this leftover
is called objet petit a?the small object of a. The being of this object of a
can be located in the Imaginary, which is the product of signification; or
in the Real, indicating the failure of symbolic integration.
The Lacanian universe has three registers: the real, the symbolic, and
the imaginary. The Lacanian real, according to Zizek (1989:162), has two

sides: "the brute and pre-symbolic reality which always returns to its
place," and the (presupposed) cause of a series of structural effects. In
other words, the Lacanian real is a paradox. Zizek most clearly renders
the two paradoxical sides of the real: "[T]he real designates a substantial
hard kernel that precedes and resists symbolization and, simultaneously, it
designates the left-over, which is posited or 'produced' by symbolization
itself" (Zizek, 1993:36). The paradox is, put somewhat simplistically, that
the real is a remainder and a surplus at the same time. Figure 1, which is

also Lacan's formulation of the master's discourse (Lacan, 2007:29-32),

may further explicate the paradox.
In Fig. 1, the symbolic is presented as a chain of signifiers: Si?S2.

Si stands for the master or master signifier that totalizes the field of
knowledge, S2 is a set of signifiers that only achieve stable meanings
through Si. A convenient exemplary case is Giddens's notion of structure
as rules and resources. Here, the signifier "structure" functions precisely
as the master signifier that integrates and regulates the infinite interplay of
rules and resources. If one stays at the upper level of the figure, one only
sees a purely symbolic field, what one would call the (social) reality. What
is hidden underneath is the Lacanian subject that is the very split between

master's signifier, a dominant social identity forced on a person, for
instance, and the leftover or surplus of her/his identification. This leftover
surplus is what Lacan calls the objet petit a, or the small object of a. Such

a peculiar name indicates that this object cannot be recognized in any
positivity. Instead, it is an object sustained only through the split-subject's
6 Here, we witness two strategies to maintain discursive consistency: Giddens's atemporal
duality of structure and agency that eventually leads to temporal process of structuration;
and Archer's and, arguably, Emirbayer and Mische's narratives of a temporal space pro
posed to resolve the paradox in the atemporal presuppositions.
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indicator of the failure of a certain system's observation. Instead, the split
subject renders it possible to conceive of agency in a different manner.
Along the dimension of the Lacanian real, agency in most current theories
of structuration and practice returns as an object (of a) to the structural
holes precisely at the moment of the failure of structural explanations. This
point has been, if not explicitly stated, strongly suggested in some sociolo
gists' works. For instance, Ryan's pithy analysis of the Nicaraguan Revolu

tion (Ryan, 2000) introduces the revolutionary agents precisely at the
points where the purely structural explanations fail. He perspicaciously rec
ognizes the gap between structural conditions and the actual social events.
In other words (if we can elaborate Ryan's points further at the risk of
reading too much into his argument), the gap between structural conditions
and actual social-revolutionary events is abysmal. There is no enumerative
strategy that would bridge this gap. Put simply, in examining social trans
formations, the list of structural conditions concerning the pr?state would
never sufficiently fill in the gap between the pre- and the poststate formed
by the researcher. Formations of social, cultural, economic, and political
conditions always stumble on the Real that is the beyond of such social
realities posited as structural conditions. It is strictly in this sense that
agency as real always returns to such structural gaps.

How, then, should we understand the thesis that agency is at the

same time a fantasmic (imagined) Thing? One way to approach this issue
is to get closer to what is supposed to be agency to the point where it dis
solves. One of the best places to perform such an operation is the domain

of social psychology. Take, for example, Tsushima and Burke's (1999)
work on levels of the parent identity and how the women they studied
exhibit different types of (lack of) agency because of such internally strati
fied identities: principle-oriented mothers exhibit more agency than their
counterparts, the program-oriented mothers. Closely examined, one can

not help wondering: Are not the principles, values, and norms already
parts in an ideological symbolic order, and their internalization already
products of socioeconomic circumstances?their own upbringings, for
instance, which Tsushima and Burke recognize in their conclusion? Again,
with a similar operation of subtraction performed on such agency?taking
away the identities, principles, and values as effects of socialization, what
is left is a void, the name of actor without any substance. Agency thus

dissolves immediately once we take away the notion of parent as an

identity (and its derivatives such as values and principles, or lack thereof)
from parenting. Identification with an identity and acting accordingly (in
accordance with the values, principles, rules, abilities, resources, etc.) only
bears witness to the efficacy of the structure signified through the master

This content downloaded from
130.68.120.136 on Mon, 21 Sep 2020 16:35:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Agency: The Internal Split of Structure

491

signifier, for example, the identity of parent and its supporting ideological
system.
In this sense, the formation of structure and agency is homologous

to Lacan's formula of sexuation (Lacan, 1998:78-89). In this two-sided

formula, two paradoxical logics are proposed. On the masculine side, the
universal function (the phallic function) to which all Xs are submitted
implies an exception: there is at least one X that is not submitted to the

function. Without elaborating on Lacan's notions of the masculine and
feminine, we can simply point out that what Lacan aims at with regard to
the masculine logic is that any universal function such as the concept of
structure in sociological theories implies a constitutive exception, namely,
the positing act that establishes such universal functions. In other words,
we implicitly accept our structural explanations as universal, as the totality
of the social, while ignoring the very positing of such totalities. It is in this
sense that structure is on the side of the masculine. Agency, which is het
erogeneous to structure, is on the feminine side, whose logic states that
there is no X that is not submitted to the universal function, but that not

all Xs are submitted to it. This seemingly paradoxical "formula" points
precisely to the ways the notion of agency is treated in sociological theory:
every conceivable form of agency is intricately intertwined with the notion
of structure, nonetheless one cannot conclude that all agency is structural.

Put it in psychoanalytical terms, agency is the symptom of structure:
agency cannot achieve its identity with itself, and for structure to achieve
its identity, it has to invent agency to conceal its own gaps (see Zizek,
1990:253 for an analogous discussion on man and woman).
If agency only achieves its identity through structure, then a direct
treatment of agency would inevitably fall back onto some structural for

mation or tautological rendition such as Emirbayer and Mische's triadic
agency (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Take, for instance, Emirbayer and
Mische's definition of agency: the temporally constructed engagement by
actors of different structural environments?the temporal-relational contexts
of action?which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment,

both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive responses
to the problems posed by changing historical situations (Emirbayer and
Mische, 1998:970). One question needs to be asked before anyone applies
such a definition to research: Are "structural environments" conceivable

without actors? If the answer is yes, then the actors are dispensable or
replaceable, and structures can effectively reproduce themselves. There is
no reason why one should attribute agency to the actors instead of the
structure. If the answer is no, then the actors are already part of the struc
tural environments. The challenge is how to distinguish agency from its
structural environment. Soon, one will find agency to be nothing but an
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relational and temporal position with an attributed capacity, a purely
structural effect.

As soon as one tries to conceive agency as independent from any
structural or symbolic order (or pattern), one finds that agency becomes
the very gap between itself and the structure, as if an unknown cause of
itself has to be posited. Archer correctly points out the mistakes in the
upward and downward conflations: to treat either structure or agency as
epiphenomenon. But to avoid conflation of either type, that is, to find a
third way out, often leads to pseudo-dialectical notions such as structur

ation or practice. Following Zizek's discussion on dialectics (Zizek,

1993:122-124), we should argue that an authentic dialectical gesture here
is not to synthesize the two notions as, for instance, two moments of cer
tain process such as structuration or practice but, rather, to recognize the
very gap between the two and to assert that the very gap is constitutive of
structure. In other words, the very gap between the notion of structure
and agency is the inner split of structure, and agency is from the begin
ning structure's posited other and it embodies the possibility and impossi
bility of structure. That is to say, on one hand, agency is the horizon of
structure, the limit that always escapes the grip of structure yet internally
conceived in structure. On the other hand, the very impossibility to be
captured by structure is what sustains the very notion of structure as its
boundary. It is in this sense that we can return to Sewell's argument that
"[a]gency is implied by the existence of structure" (Sewell, 1992:20).

STRUCTURE, HEGEMONY, AND SYMBOLIC ORDER
The above argument, that agency is but an effect of the internal split

of structure, ought to be understood neither as an ultimate totality of
structure (structural determinism) nor as a need to synthesize the dual
concepts (asserting duality or dualism). To reformulate the concepts of
structure and agency, two theses need to be proposed here. The first is the

Lacanian conception of subject as the very split between a (social) sym

bolic order and a fantasmic object that is the very void-exclusion-surplus
of the symbolic order. What needs to be affirmed with regard to this point
is that this object is a paradoxical one, which never appears in positivity.
Furthermore, this split-subject is not yet agency but a condition of agency.
In other words, it opens the possibility of agency. The second thesis con
cerns directly with reformulating the notion of structure: structural forma

tions are never complete because they always entail operations of

exclusion posited as a beyond. In this section, I try to explicate this argu
ment and address the theoretical consequences of this thesis.
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Wrong's nearly half-century old critique of the o ver socialized concep

tion of man (Wrong, 1961) points in a direction that is still important
today. In his frequently cited article, Wrong proposes a thesis originated
with Freud: "man is a social animal without being entirely a socialized
animal" (1961:192). In other words, the socialization process is never com
plete and there is always a leftover that resists socialization. Although one
can immediately recognize that such a remainder is but a myth, the signifi
cance of Wrong's proposal lies elsewhere. As a theoretical gesture, what

Wrong effectively rejects is the conception of human beings as (social)
automata. Our attention, however, should not turn to the supposed unso
cialized remainder because it would be wrong to refer to any positive ani

malistic traits humans manifest as evidence of such leftovers of
socialization. In so doing we will soon find those animalistic traits only
too human. The real task for the social theorist is to distinguish humans
from social automaton. This distinction lies precisely in the very gesture
of asserting herself/himself as human in addition to all the roles, identi
ties, and relations. Humans are social animals who not only refer to them
selves, as the symbolic interactionist would argue (Blumer, 1968), but refer
to their referring. It should be noted that what is suggested here is neither

some negative position one is able to take in relation to certain social

identities, roles, and relations nor a kind of humanist assertion of some
inborn human essence; instead, the very act of recognizing one's social
identities and roles and at the same time asserting that one is more than
the social is the very proof of one's humanness. This is the Lacanian split
subject (S) that, on one hand, is displaced/decentered onto the symbolic
Other, and on the other, occupies the very gap/split as its "being." What
is needed with regard to structure is a similar reformulation, that is, to
assert Lacan's logic of sexuation on the feminine side: although every for
mulation of social phenomena is structural, all of the social field is not
structural. This does not mean that there are things in the presymbolic
social field that cannot be incorporated into structural formation; instead,
it means that, on one hand, no structural formation is able to grasp the
totality of the social, and on the other, the irreconcilable gaps among vari
ous structural formations bear witness to the Non-All of these formations,
and the possibility of shifting from one formation to another points to a
certain fundamental antagonism (the Lacanian real) that resists symbolic

incorporation (Zizek, 2006:25-26, 253). This is also what Laclau means
with the statement that society as such is impossible (Laclau, 1990).
Therefore, as a first step we should unequivocally reject the notion
that structure is something that really exists independent of any significa
tion. Such structures are already posited as the beyond or limits of a cer

tain system of signification. Any such assertion merely indicates the
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inability to signify them. Thus it should be emphatically stated that social
(cultural, political, economic, etc.) structures are always signified struc
tures, albeit mis-signified structures. It should be noted that the notion of
mis-signification is not to be understood as false consciousness. The idea
of false consciousness is not sustainable without some conception of real
reality (Laclau, 1990). In his effort to reformulate the notion of the ideo
logical, Laclau asserts that "[t]he ideological would not consist of the mis
recognition of a positive essence, but exactly opposite: it would consists of
the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the
impossibility of any ultimate suture" (Laclau, 1990:92, emphasis added).
What Laclau's definition of the ideological entails is a sociopolitical field
that competing social discourses endeavor to hegemonize. The ideological
is thus the discursive gesture that claims not being ideological. This leads
to the second point: structure is to be understood as discursive or sym
bolic formation of the social field that is defined by the symbolic forma
tion through inclusion and exclusion. The self-referentiality?a symbolic
formation defines its own object?captures precisely the fundamental par
adox that is constitutive of the social field.

One of the most important Lacanian tenets concerning discourse qua
instantiation of the symbolic order is that the infinite sliding of a discur

sive field is only (temporarily) stabilized or totalized through what is
known as quilting points, point de capiton (Lacan, 2006:681). Conse
quently, in order to conceive a system in its totality, there needs to be at
least one signifier that refers to the system itself. The self-referentiality of
such a signifier immediately produces a paradox: on one hand, the signi
fier that refers to the totality of the system indicates precisely a beyond of
it?the excluded that would subvert the system if included. On the other
hand, the beyond (or limit) of the totality of a system signifies the failure
of the signifying act, namely, the very impossibility of signifying the
beyond. Thus the reference to a beyond is the only condition to conceive
a system in its totality. Then, the fundamental paradox of a totalized sys
tem is that the failure of totalizing serves as the very condition of the pos

sibility of a totality7 (Laclau, 1996:37-40). One of the best examples is
functionalist theory, which in resolving the problem concerning dysfunc
tions, a typical solution is to conceive dysfunction as serving certain func
tions in society. Here, Laclau's formulation on social totalization helps us

7 I should admit here that this paragraph is a(n) (over)simplified representation of Laclau's
wonderful discussion on empty signifier and hegemonic formation. Within the limit of
space here I cannot possibly provide a more elaborate summary. Moreover, Laclau's for

mulation of paradox parallels that of Luhmann's, suggesting a likely relation between
semiotics and systems theory.
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recognize how functionalist theory inscribes its own excluded beyond as
an internal difference in a paradoxical manner.

Thus, the second important step in reformulating the notion of

structure is to recognize that social structures, as social symbolic forma

tions, are always contingent on acts of positing master signifiers and
are always dislocated in the sense that their meaningfulness and efficacy

depend on an excluded (and disavowed) beyond that serves as the

ground. Put differently, a symbolic social formation entails a relation
"by which a particular content becomes the signifier of the absent com

munitarian fullness" (Laclau, 1996:43). For instance, systemic function
in functionalist theories stands for the absent fullness of Society. This
relation between the particular and universal is what Laclau has termed

as hegemony. Here, the signifier of the capitalized "Society" signifies
the impossibility of conceiving the social in its totality, which Laclau
calls an empty signifier (Laclau, 1996:36-40). Functionalist theories are
endeavors to hegemonize the social field as universal through particular
contents of system-functions. What needs to be clarified immediately at
this point is that such hegemony is necessary and its encounter with its
own paradox, for instance, the function of dysfunction, is inevitable.
Another example is action theory itself in an imagined scenario I would

call "when the action theorist meets Mertonian retreatist" (Merton,
1957:153). Our reluctance to recognize action in what the Mertonian
homeless loiterer does?subsisting in whatever he can get licitly or illic
itly, attests to the inherent paradox of action theory. Agamben's Homo

Sacer, people who are deprived of any identities and legal protection,
points to yet another form of inaction (Agamben, 1998). Similarly, the
notion of refugee, people who, as victims of certain ethnic or political
cleansing, live indefinitely in humanitarian camps, already contains our
expectation that they would not act on their own. Their fate is either
in the hands of diplomatic negotiators or at the mercy of their persecu
tors. Here, action theory encounters its own exclusion, situations in
which groups of people are reduced to nonactors.
What we can conclude from the above discussion is that, using one
of Lacan's sexuation formulas, all is socialized (thus structural) but the
social is Non-All. Social structures are not just generative rules and
resources that condition the infinite play of goals, identities, and relations.

A social structural formation always contains an attempt to block the
uncertainty and undecidability of its own field through inclusion and
exclusion. From a theoretical viewpoint analogous to what the systems
theorist calls second-order observer, conceiving structures as paradoxical,
incomplete, and contingent symbolic formations opens up the possibility

of addressing the issue of agency, socially transformational agency in
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particular, as located in the gaps of structural formations and also as the
struggle for hegemonizing the social.

MOMENTS OF AGENCY
If we adopt the Lacanian notion of the split subject and Laclau's for
mulation of structures as paradoxical and contingent symbolic hegemonic
formations, how do we proceed to examine agentic actions, more specifi
cally, socially transformational actions? To address this question, I would

like to start with an example: Stones's examination of Ibsen's A Doll's
House (Stones, 2005:179-188), which, although providing a vigorous and
sometimes insightful analysis, nonetheless fails at a crucial point. This
analysis faithfully adheres to Giddens's framework of structuration, which
turns out to be its strength and its weakness. First of all, Stones's analysis
correctly identifies the external structural clusters such as economic rela
tions (banking system in particular), legal institutions, and ideologies of
family, love, patriarchy, and so forth, as the causal forces of the practices
of the protagonists in their diegetic universe. Stones then moves to investi
gate how the position-practice (structure and structuration) and disposi
tional formulation and reformulation of the internal structures (actors)

drive the narrative events to unfold. Toward the end of the analysis,
addressing the most important event in the play, namely, Nora's exit,
Stones writes:

It is the reconfiguration and re-evaluation of her hierarchy of priorities that also

allows leaving the "Doll's House" to become a "feasible option" for Nora. ...

With the subversive, wrenching, realignment of her world-view, many of the causal
forces that once had this irresistible power to influence her actions now no longer

have the causal efficacy. She now feels it possible not to live in fear of Torvald's
displeasure, of transgressing his patriarchal, constricting and pompous norms of
propriety. (Stones, 2005:187)

There is no doubt that Nora's world is reconfigured toward the end
of the play, but to argue that Nora somehow conducts a r??valuation of

"her hierarchy of priorities" and consequently finds leaving the doll's
house a feasible option misses the point completely. Nora's act of leaving
the doll's house has to be understood as an act of the impossible in the
sense that the decision cannot be grounded in any rational calculation or
evaluation. Already at the beginning of the long dialogue between Nora
and Torvald in the last act, Nora points out: "You and father have done
me a great wrong. It is your fault that my life has come to nothing." Is
this not a way to say that I have come to the realization that I am noth
ing of importance in your world since you are (always) ready to sacrifice
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me when you have to save your honor? It can also be argued that this is
the very moment that Nora, in choosing the two sides of the split-subject,
which is fundamentally different from making choices within a structural
context, chooses the side of the void that is the gap between symbolic
identities and the position to choose, and her only option is to reject the
symbolic definition of her being.

Therefore, far from a calculated act, Nora's exit defies any causal

chain embedded in the symbolic order of rationality. Ultimately, Nora is
indifferent to the symbolic order, or the law. Her double transgression,
forging her father's signature and forging her father's signature, already
attests to her indifference. What collapses when her husband shows him
self as an outraged but impotent coward is not the symbolic order but
Torvald's love for her that is sustained by her fantasy, the Thing (object
of a) in her that deserves his love. This fantasmic core of her being is what
sustains her life in the doll's house, which stands for dull and trivial bour
geois family life. It is clear that Nora's readiness to sacrifice her own life
(suicide) for this fantasmic core (love) bears witness to her indifference to
the symbolic order, a readiness for mutual cancellation to save the fantas
mic core. Her final choice of leaving the house rather than committing sui

cide points to the loss of the reason of self-sacrifice, the loss of her
fantasmic kernel. This argument also points to the mistake in Stones's

analysis when he states that Nora "now feels it possible not to live in fear
of Torvald's displeasure, of transgressing his patriarchal, constricting and

pompous norms of propriety" (quoted above). It is in retrospect that

Nora finds life in the doll's house unbearable and Torvald's norms of pro
priety constricting and pompous. Just a moment ago she was ready to sac

rifice herself for this alleged unbearable life. The mistake of Stones's

analysis can be attributed at least partially to his overly faithful adherence
to the framework of structuration. What his analysis fails to recognize

is precisely the split-void as the subject that defies and questions the

(normative) social symbolic order. That said, the gestures of defiance and
questioning per se are only one moment of agency, its efficacy?its realiza
tion?needs to be registered in a (new) symbolic order.
In her analysis of Rosa Parks's role in the civil rights movement,
Lovell (2003) points out the possibility that Rosa Parks's refusal to yield
her seat and her subsequent arrest may have ended up in the long silent
list of similar incidents that had occurred previously. Nonetheless, Rosa
Parks's heroic act did catalyze the ensuing social movement. Lovell perspi
caciously recognizes the retroactive character of Parks's authority. A clo
ser look at the sequence of events shows that Parks's act of refusal can be
read as coinciding with Lacan's discourse of the hysteric (Nora's exit can

also be understood as such a discursive gesture). In this discourse
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possibility manifesting itself in contingent acts and, second, the agentic
potentiality is only actualized (as necessity) through a retroactively estab
lished discourse. Such a two-moment conception of agency rejects histori
cist reduction of a significant social and political event to its historical and
situational circumstances and by doing so opens a space for social trans
formational agency.
In the above case, the first moment is one at which the (racist seg

regationist) symbolic structural order fails. In other words, it is brea

ched by incidental personal acts. However, without a competing
symbolic order to translate such breaches as failed struggles for justice

and equality, the existing social order may simply handle such situa

tions as minor disturbances, like how the many drivers managed similar

situations. Parks's act may have lost in history as a failed attempt to
defend one's right. The competing antisegregationist symbolic order
started to take root precisely through translating Parks's failure into
not only a victorious demonstration of courage but also the symbol of
a long series of failed struggles. The parallel between the couple Parks
King and Jesus-St. Paul is obvious. No wonder Zizek views St. Paul as
the establisher of the master signifier in Christianity. What is crucial in
the Pauline discursive gesture is to translate an unbearable failure (God's
own death) into triumph. As Zizek indicates repeatedly, the installation

of a master (signifier) does not change anything in positive reality: it
changes everything (Zizek, 2005:125).

CONCLUSION
Agency conceived as ability and knowledge (or knowledgeability) of
rules, norms, values, and possession of, or accessibility to, resources can

be decomposed into structural components. What is knowledge if not

some structural effect of socialization institutions? What are resources if

not some stratified structural positions? To argue that such agency resides
in the individual actor is an empty assertion of an abstract actor of no
positive existence. Such assertions, which often lead to what Fuchs calls
"heavy rhetoric" (Fuchs, 2001:29), result from the disavowed act of posit
ing agency as a fantasmic object to fill in the structural gaps. It is in this
sense that one can say: agency is the internal split of structure. As one
gets closer to such conceptions of agency, agency disappears. In fact, con
ceiving agency as the capacity to act in accordance with certain rules and
to mobilize resources within structured situations always relies on certain

notions of rationality. The above critique of Stones's analysis of Ibsen's

A Doll's House shows that acts are sometimes not grounded in any
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rationality, which by no means entails unintelligibility. In fact, it can be
argued that Nora's act does not fit the definition of any form of (Weberi
an) rationality. It is a pure ethical act in the Kantian sense. The efficacy

of authentic social transformational agency consists in rejecting pre
cisely the rationalities imposed and regulated by existing social structural
formations.

To avoid the dead-end of structural determinism and the various
conflationist entanglements, two steps have been taken. First, the Laca
nian split-subject is introduced to conceive the actor-agent as a two-sided
subject that is the split between the inside and outside of a certain struc
tural formation. This in turn requires a reformulation of the notion of
structure. Thus, in a second step, Laclau's theory on hegemony is brought
in to reconceptualize structures as inherently paradoxical social symbolic
formations that always need to posit their own beyond through exclusion.
This conception depicts structures as always partial and unstable, open to
new formations. As a result, agency can be recognized in two moments
conceived as two symbolic gestures. In the first, the subject-agent occupies
its own void in questioning the Master (the big Other as a signifier for cer
tain dominant symbolic order) and hystericizes the Master by means of
which it returns the subject's lack-split back into the Master. In the sec
ond moment, a founding gesture establishes a new social symbolic order
that transforms a current struggle as manifestation and representation of
all previously failed struggles.
What is discernible in the arguments made above is their lineage with
one of sociology's most important paradigms, namely, conflict theories,
which, to a great extent, have been displaced into a multidimensional or
even multiculturalist framework of class, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality,

and more to come. The close and intricate entanglement of structure
agency theories with the notion of social identity bears witness to efforts

of translating conflicts into differences. The strength of the Laca
nian/Zizekian and Laclauan perspectives, which is also what distinguishes
these perspectives from traditional conflict framework, comes from their
insistence on a certain fundamental antagonism, a hard kernel or the Lac
anian real that only manifests as the gaps among social symbolic forma

tions. Ultimately, it is this relocation of antagonism from positive
differences into the negative that renders possible reformulations of struc
ture and agency.
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